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Externalities: why environmental sociology should bring them in
Malcolm Fairbrother*
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The concept of externalities represents the core of environmental economics but appears much less in sociology and other
social sciences. This article presents the concept of externalities and makes a case for its usefulness, noting reasons why
environmental sociologists should like it and use it more than they do currently. The concept is closely tied to theories – of
why environmental problems occur and how they can be addressed – which contradict influential perspectives in environ-
mental sociology. But an externalities-centred approach to environmental issues is nonetheless highly sociological and
consistent with current research in other subfields. From an externalities perspective, environmental problems and protection
are intrinsically social, and often highly political, rooted in relations of injustice and/or distrust. Practically, the most
promising solutions to environmental problems embody a balance of market liberalism and strong state regulation.
Externalities should therefore be a constructively unifying concept for environmental research across the social sciences.
The concept is also provocative; however, in that its diagnosis of environmental problems amounts to powerful advocacy for
major policy changes – even if within capitalism and given continued economic growth.
Keywords: environmental externalities; treadmill of production; ecological modernization; collective action; environmental
policy
1. Introduction
This article presents the concept of externalities, makes a
case for its usefulness, and identifies a range of implica-
tions that follow from studying environmental issues
through the conceptual lens of externalities.1 The concept
defines a theoretical perspective on – and thus clarifies –
what environmental problems are, where they come from,
and how to solve them. This perspective stands apart from
much of contemporary environmental sociology. Many
studies in environmental sociology today focus on the
propensity of individuals and/or firms to engage in volun-
tary altruistic actions. Others make sweeping claims about
the inherently and inescapably anti-environmental proper-
ties of capitalism and/or economic growth. In contrast, an
externalities perspective sets individuals’ actions in social
perspective, emphasizes that environmental protection is a
collective rather than individual endeavour, and acknowl-
edges that some environmental problems get resolved
while others do not. In this view, environmental protection
is a variable outcome, which depends on how social and
political factors shape key institutions and public policies.
Capitalism, growth, and rising standards of living are not
necessarily impediments.
This article recommends that sociologists make greater
use of the concept of externalities, despite its origins in a
rival discipline – economics – that many sociologists
regard with suspicion. Currently, sociological literature
references externalities much less often than does literature
in economics. Two recent reviews of the field of environ-
mental sociology make no reference to the concept at all
(Dunlap 2015; Lidskog, Mol, and Oosterveer 2015).
Pellow and Brehm (2013, 234) use the word ‘externalize’
only once, in the context of discussing the rich world’s
imposition of environmental costs on poor countries. On
one quite active environmental sociology e-mail list, the
word ‘externality’ (or any variant thereof) received only a
few dozen mentions over the course of a decade, in con-
trast for example to thousands of references to capitalism.2
Incorporating the concept of externalities would therefore
represent a substantial change for environmental
sociology.
The next section of this article defines externalities,
clarifies the fundamental reason why environmental pro-
blems occur, and provides a precise definition of what
environmental problems are. Section 3 discusses how the
concept of externalities suggests that the most promising
public policy solutions to environmental problems embody
a balance of market liberalism and strong state regulation
of markets. Section 4 explains how strongly sociological
and political reasons explain why environmental problems
get solved in some instances and contexts, but not others.
Section 5 describes how an externalities perspective
speaks to current debates and influential theoretical per-
spectives in environmental sociology and helps to resolve
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2. Why do people pollute the environment (too much)?
What is an ‘externality’? The costs of some activity are
‘externalized’ when they are imposed on someone without
compensation.3 In many domains of social and economic
life, producers and consumers engage in activities or make
exchanges wherein everyone involved believes s/he has
something to gain, and where all the costs and benefits are
borne and enjoyed by parties internal to the process or
transaction. But sometimes the production, consumption,
transportation, or exchange of a good or service entails the
imposition of costs on other parties – such as in the form
of some unwanted transformation of the natural or physi-
cal world called ‘pollution’. (All of the following holds
not just for pollution, but also for the use of a resource
consequently less available to others.) The burning of jet
fuel in the course of my air travel imposes costs on others,
for example, in forms such as noise pollution and climate
change. In eating a fish, I am making one less fish avail-
able to everyone else. In clearing my land of forest, I may
endanger a species that helps pollinate flowers in a nearby
park. In each of these situations, I enjoy the benefits of
consuming a service or good, or of effecting some trans-
formation of nature; but some of the costs of my activity
are borne by (external, uncompensated) others.
Looked at this way, externalities are the root of all
problems typically called ‘environmental’,4 and indeed
one of the merits of the concept of externalities is that it
clarifies what environmental problems are. As people col-
lectively impose many costs on others – and potentially on
each other – the overall consequence is a situation of sub-
stantial unwanted environmental change: irritatingly high
ambient noise levels, global warming, shrinking fish stocks,
biodiversity loss. Environmental problems are therefore
problems of social coordination (Ostrom 2003), or in the
terminology of economists a form of market failure. That is,
in such cases, markets – which are often quite effective in
coordinating people’s pursuit of well-being – do not achieve
optimal well-being. Protecting the environment, conversely,
is a solution to this collective action problem, a means of
achieving greater human welfare (Pearce 2002).
Aside from providing a clear definition of what envir-
onmental problems are, the concept of externalities has the
merit of explaining why environmental problems occur.
Such problems reflect that each of us individually decides
whether to engage in some polluting activity without fully
taking into account the costs of our pollution – precisely
because we can externalize some of those costs onto
others. Since individuals receive all the benefits but pay
only part of the price, they engage in some activities that
are actually more costly than beneficial for society as a
whole, particularly if ‘society as a whole’ is taken to
include future generations. It is for this reason that envir-
onmental degradation is a collective action problem, and,
as per the well-known parable of the tragedy of the com-
mons (Hardin 1968), ‘a wedge exists between what a
private person does given market prices and what society
might want him or her to do to protect the environment.
Such a wedge implies wastefulness or economic ineffi-
ciency’ (Hanley, Shogren, and White 2007, 42). We can
distinguish and label transformations of nature that do
society as a whole more harm than good as ‘overpollu-
tion’ – pollution that surpasses the optimal level, which
would be achieved if the price incentives facing indivi-
duals reflected activities’ full social costs.5
It may sound odd to suggest that the optimal level of
pollution is not zero, but once we reflect on what it would
cost to eliminate pollution from activities of value, or
alternatively the cost of foregoing those activities entirely,
it becomes clear. Eliminating all pollution would require
the transformation of human existence in ways that would
severely undermine our quality of life. Many activities
generate modest amounts of pollution relative to their
benefits, such that the pollution is worth the cost. We
should not therefore seek to eliminate all pollution, and
indeed the problem is not that we have some pollution.
The problem is that we have too much: the overpollution.
In a sense, this perspective even helps clarify what
‘pollution’ is. Without the concept of externalities, we
are left with little guidance about how to classify and
assess the merits of many human activities. Why do we
call some transformations of nature ‘pollution’ (which we
instinctively classify as bad) and others ‘development’
(which is good)? To weigh the pros and cons and make
an overall assessment, an externalities-based approach
provides us with a relatively clear criterion: do the benefits
of an action to all people (including future generations)
exceed the costs? If there is a net cost, we would probably
wish for some polluting activity not to occur.6
3. Arresting overpollution
To summarize thus far, environmental problems are
instances where negative externalities are imposed through
the medium of the physical and natural worlds – in non-
living forms such as SO2 and living forms like lost hon-
eybees. An externalities-based view of environmental
degradation emphasizes not just that pollution and
resource use have costs, but that polluters and resource
users over-engage in polluting and resource-using activ-
ities specifically because they burden others with some of
the costs of those activities, rather than themselves.
For that reason, from an externalities perspective, the
most effective means of minimizing pollution is to stop it
from being artificially cheap to the polluter – by intention-
ally attaching an additional cost to the polluting activity in
question. This can take the form of a tax or a requirement
that polluters buy permits and surrender them when enga-
ging in some polluting or resource-depleting activity (e.g.,
Prasad 2010). In the former case, the price of polluting is
fixed, while in the latter the price of polluting depends on
the market price of a permit. Both types of measures raise
the price of polluting activities to the polluter, reflecting
the social costs of the environmental harms they cause (see
e.g., Endres 2011).7 Making polluters pay to pollute also
furthers the cause of fairness, in allocating the costs to the
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responsible party and beneficiary rather than to actors who
played no role in causing the problem and who suffered
because of it. Such measures also provide an incentive for
firms to develop technologies that will meet consumers’
demands at declining environmental cost over time.
The track records of environmental taxes and tradable
emission permits systems are generally very good (e.g.,
Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Tietenberg 2013). The first
large-scale, market-based scheme under which pollution
was specifically discouraged with a price signal was an
SO2 allowance trading program established by the United
States in the early 1990s. The program proved highly
successful, with the value of its benefits – including unan-
ticipated ones for human health – far exceeding the costs
(Schmalensee and Stavins 2013).8 Charges and taxes have
also been effective in mitigating other kinds of environ-
mental externalities. Road charges have worked to reduce
traffic congestion (Albalate and Bel 2009; Leape 2006).
Attaching even a miniscule charge substantially reduces
people’s use of plastic bags (Luís and Spínola 2010). With
respect to climate change, a carbon tax in British
Columbia has led to significant reductions in CO2 emis-
sions per capita relative to other provinces in Canada (see
Elgie and McClay 2013).
That said, such measures have not always achieved as
much as environmental advocates have hoped, and so they
have come in for some criticism (e.g., Foster, Clark, and
York 2009).9 The European Union’s Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) has been a disappointment, for example,
insofar as it has provided firms with little incentive to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, that is not a
reason to think that the ETS was flawed in principle.
Instead, like in many cases (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern
2003), political forces shaped the scheme’s design in
ways that have limited its effectiveness (Anthoff and
Hahn 2010). The number of allowances issued under the
ETS proved excessive given the massive economic con-
traction unleashed in the scheme’s early years by the
global financial crisis (Sandbag 2012). Consistent with
theory, this major over-allocation (a large supply relative
to demand) led to a very low market price per permit, and
raising the price of pollution only slightly above its prior
price of zero meant the scheme would never have much
impact on firms’ behaviour. Even despite this problem,
however, the ETS did lead to some – small – reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions (Anthoff and Hahn 2010). And
notwithstanding the modest contribution of the ETS, total
emissions from the EU-28 declined 20% from 1990 to
2013 – albeit because of other policies.10
If measures were taken to internalize more externalities
than at present, people would still be free to pollute,
though polluting activities would become more expensive.
Would buying or doing everything, then, be depressingly
costly? Not necessarily. Many goods and activities would
not be so expensive, because their environmental impacts
are minor. Their prices would remain about the same,
while the revenues from taxes/permits levied on pollution
would effectively allow states to lower the price of many
other things (most obviously, other taxes). As such, living
standards would be largely unchanged, even while the
balance of incentives would change, making environmen-
tally harmful activities much more expensive relative to
benign ones.
Pricing environmental externalities can raise distri-
butional concerns, because they sometimes reduce the
disposable incomes of lower income households pro-
portionately more than they do higher income house-
holds – though sometimes they can also do the
opposite (e.g., Santos and Rojey 2004). Where the
impacts are potentially regressive, compensatory mea-
sures can be taken. British Columbia’s carbon tax was,
for example, introduced in tandem with a ‘Low Income
Climate Action Tax Credit’ weighted towards poorer
households. As a consequence, the tax’s overall impact
has probably been progressive (Murray and Rivers
2015).
Even if the full internalization of environmental
externalities would alter many incentives facing firms
and consumers, the enactment of measures to achieve
this end would not require any fundamental or revolu-
tionary social transformation (contrary, for example, to
arguments such as Foster 2002). Such measures would
embody a balance of market liberalism and strong state
regulation of markets. The internalization of environmen-
tal externalities is therefore consistent with the main
thrust of most economic sociology since the 1990s:
rejecting laissez-faire and the ability of markets to reg-
ulate themselves, holding that states must govern markets
in order for their influence to be benign, but also recog-
nizing that – governed appropriately – markets can serve
people well. Competent governance by capable states can
make markets work for development (Evans 1995), while
social democracy and the welfare protections can sub-
stantially tame and mitigate the destructions of unregu-
lated capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990).
4. The sociopolitical foundations of externalities and
their prevention
So why do some environmental externalities get addressed
and corrected in some instances, but not others? An
externalities-based view points to strongly sociological
and political reasons for environmental degradation versus
protection.
Pollution is always an injustice, insofar, as polluters
force others to pay for something from which they get
no benefit: they ‘cause damage to third parties [without
being] required to pay for that damage’ (Pearce 2002,
58). Pollution could even be taken as a ‘by-product of a
production or consumption process that harms or other-
wise violates the property rights of others’ (Cordado
2001, 11), in which case it is even a kind of theft – a
theft of well-being. Since externalities are ubiquitous,
from this perspective we are all thieves, all the time.
The fact that we do it reciprocally to each other does not
stop it from being theft, though situations of reciprocal
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externalization are somewhat distinct from those where
the externalization runs only one way (Mitchell 2003). It
is useful to consider these scenarios separately in prin-
ciple, though in practice the difference between them is
a question of degrees.
In situations of reciprocal pollution, environmental
protection is strongly dependent on the very sociological
concern that is trust. Generalized and political trust
strongly influence people’s support for public policies
that protect the environment (Fairbrother 2016) – just as
sociologists have found they contribute to many other
forms of collective action (Simpson and Willer 2015).
People who are trusting expect others to make offsetting
efforts to protect the environment, and they have confi-
dence that public authorities will implement systems for
environmental protection as promised, because they have
the requisite levels of expertise and administrative capacity
and are not corrupt. Such people therefore engage more in
activities like recycling, conserving water, using public
transport, and buying green products (Irwin and Berigan
2013), and they are more willing to pay money for the
environment (Jones, Malesios, and Botetzagias 2009;
Meyer and Liebe 2010).
Situations entailing the imposition of an externality
by one party on others, but not the reverse, are based on
power imbalances. Environmental degradation here
yields clear winners and losers and depends on the
power of the former to impose costs on the latter
(Boyce 1994). There are also many power imbalances
in the vulnerability to externalities. For some people, it
may be easy to avoid paying some environmental price –
buying water privately, paying for residences outside of
areas with severe air pollution, and so on (Torras and
Boyce 1998). Activities whose benefits to an individual
or group exceed the costs to society as a whole (includ-
ing future generations) may therefore not only harm
society collectively, but also entail a problematic distri-
bution of the costs and benefits. Some people benefit at
the expense of others, and so it might be the case that
some people have reason not to want externalities inter-
nalized: they stand to lose out.
Consequently, environmental economics has long been
concerned with (in)justice (Sandmo 2015), though as long
as the net benefits to society of some measure for environ-
mental protection are positive, environmental economics
tends to say little about equity or justice. Economists’
typical concern is instead Pareto efficiency, a criterion
met when no party could be made better off without one
being made worse off. Economists emphasize that where
gains by one party come at the cost of another, if the
former’s gains exceed the latter’s losses, compensation
from the former to the latter could in principle increase
aggregate welfare. Yet, economists tend not to ask whether
winners actually do compensate losers. Whether remedies
for degradation are actually implemented is the domain of
political researchers, then, not economists (Boyce 1994,
170). Enter, then, sociology.
5. Externalities and current perspectives in
environmental sociology
The concept of externalities challenges a number of
influential macro- and micro-level perspectives in con-
temporary environmental sociology and helps resolve
key ambiguities in the most important extant perspec-
tive at the meso level.
The neo-Marxist treadmill of production (TP) perspec-
tive elaborates a strongly macro-focussed theory of envir-
onmental degradation, arguing that inherent properties of
capitalism demand economic growth while ensuring that
states will never take adequate steps to make growth
environmentally benign.11 As Clark and York (2005,
412) put it, ‘the social structure of the capitalist system
sets limits and constraints on what mitigating actions will
and can be taken’. Foster, Clark, and York (2009, 1090)
completely dismiss arguments ‘that the growth of eco-
nomic value and even the production of goods can be
decoupled from the consumption of nature’s resources,
through ever greater efficiency. … All such dreams have
proven illusory’. They argue that capitalism, with ‘its
insatiable drive for accumulation, is the main engine
behind impending catastrophic climate change’. Since
capitalism is premised on endless growth and exploitation
of natural resources (e.g., Foster 2012, 2015; O’Connor
1994; Klein 2014), nothing short of a ‘revolution…is
required in order to prevent a planetary disaster’ (Foster,
Clark, and York 2009, 1085). Arguments about an ineluct-
able ‘logic of capital’ mean there is ‘no compatibility
between the law of value imposed by capitalism and the
laws of nature imposed by the biosphere’ (Foster
2015, 319).
Yet, just as the expansion of the middle class chal-
lenged Marxist theory in the twentieth century (Manza and
McCarthy 2011), the many forms of environmental
improvement that clearly have been achieved under capit-
alism sit awkwardly alongside pessimistic predictions of
inevitable worsening (e.g., Foster 2001). Such reforms
belie determinist claims of hard limits on what capitalist
states can or will do. The large differences in environmen-
tal impacts across societies and communities with similar
standards of living also demonstrate the indeterminacy of
the relationship between economic output and environ-
mental impact. Just to take one example, urban air pollu-
tion in the form of particulate matter is significantly lower
in American cities compared to German cities – despite
the higher GDP/capita of the United States. Conversely,
greenhouse gas emissions per capita are much lower in
Norway and Switzerland than in the United States, despite
their higher incomes.12
The TP perspective is therefore right that states have –
at least to this point in history – responded very inade-
quately to many environmental problems. But it is theore-
tical overreach to claim that there is an inevitably anti-
environmental ‘logic of capital’. Such suggestions are
redolent of the structural-functionalist ‘logic of industrial-
ism’ perspective prevalent in mid-twentieth century
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scholarship on the rise of the welfare state: determinist,
abstract, and not empirically faithful to many unexplained
cross-societal differences (Skocpol and Amenta 1986).
Unlike modernization theory, with its attempts to identify
universal trajectories, the social sciences today study and
seek to account for macrosocial differences: in the process
of economic development, the institutional foundations of
capitalism, and the character of postsocialist transitions
(e.g., Evans 1995; Hall and Soskice 2001; Stark and
Bruszt 2001). With respect to the environment, then, as
Dietz, Rosa, and York (2012, 25) suggest, ‘there may be
substantial heterogeneity across countries in their paths
towards or away from sustainability’.
Such diversity arises largely from politics. In the
domain of social protection, workers can sometimes impose
their preferences against the wishes of capital, or state
managers may decide to favour workers, with key outcomes
varying across time and space because of variations in the
varying power resources of different classes or differences
in key institutions (e.g., Orloff 1993; Olsen and O’Connor
1998). Similarly, with respect to the environment, states
sometimes opt for protection, and there are even instances
of firms welcoming such protection (Bonds 2016; Vogel
2000; Pulver 2007). Given the extremity of its claims, then,
TP is not an empirically defensible theory. It holds that
capitalism and economic growth make environmental pro-
tection not just unlikely but impossible, yet there are many
examples of environmental externalities that have in fact
been regulated and of environmental outcomes that have
improved over time even in increasingly affluent capitalist
societies (e.g., Dasgupta et al. 2002). Ironically, in taking
capitalism as a hard constraint on efforts to protect the
environment, this perspective also lets poor environmental
performers off the hook: they cannot be guilty of destroying
nature if capitalism made them do it.
Advocates of TP may dislike the concept of external-
ities because they find the utilitarian microfoundations of
the economic theory with which they associate it implausi-
ble (e.g., Foster 1997, 2002). But believing in the chal-
lenges of collective action does not require especially
extreme utilitarianism; most sociologists readily agree that
under some conditions individuals act selfishly in ways that
lead to collectively negative outcomes (e.g., Baldassarri
2009; Evans 1995; Granovetter 1985; Simpson and Willer
2015). Elinor Ostrom, the social scientist arguably most
celebrated for her research on the challenges of environ-
mental management, even made a name for herself –
including among economists, to the point of winning the
Nobel Prize – striking a balance between utilitarianism and
a more socialized theory of action. In her view, there are
social situations where predictions from models presuming
‘complete rationality are well supported empirically’ (2003,
25), but also others where such predictions are ‘repeatedly
shown to be empirically false’ (26). There is no contra-
diction: ‘what the research on social dilemmas demonstrates
is a world of possibility rather than one of necessity’ (62).
Trust, long-time horizons, and norms of reciprocity and
fairness shape people’s actions, but they are not always
present. The same holds for monitoring and sanctioning
institutions. At the level of firms, key decisions are broadly
rational: compliance with environmental regulations
increases as the risk of getting caught cheating increases,
and as the size of potential fines increases (Gray and
Shimshack 2011).
Advocates of TP also express reservations about the
possibility of capturing the value of nature in financial
terms, and about the technical methods and principles by
which prices on pollution and resource use are decided
(e.g., Foster 1997). Critics have been particularly hostile
towards the contingent valuation techniques used to deter-
mine what subjective value the public attaches to environ-
mental goods. Yet, economists too agree that determining
the optimal price for pollution is next to impossible, and
many accept criticisms of contingent valuation specifically
as well (e.g., Leape 2006; Parks and Gowdy 2013).
Questions certainly remain about how to put prices on
many kinds of externalities and about how to reflect the
values of environmental goods when weighing them
against the benefits of polluting activities (see e.g.,
Gsottbauer, Logar, and van den Bergh 2015; Pindyck
2013). But even if the prices set are less than perfect, it
would seem perverse to make the perfect the enemy of the
good and not attach some kind of price to pollution. It is
unclear why critics would support the alternative of keep-
ing the price at zero.
Standing in contrast to TP, other studies take a much
more micro-level approach to environmental issues. A
normative approach focuses on individuals and the issue
of their moral commitments to take steps individually to
avoid externalizing environmental costs onto others and
conversely to help provide environmental public goods.
Empirical studies investigate why people do not make
individual efforts in these regards, and why others do –
voluntarily, and at some cost to themselves (e.g., Carrico
et al. 2015; Dietz 2015).
While it is undoubtedly useful to investigate voluntary
actions for sustainability, the thrust of this approach risks
reinforcing the thinking behind former US Vice-President
Dick Cheney’s suggestion that conservation is as ‘a sign of
personal virtue’. In focussing on voluntary normative
actions, this perspective individualizes the challenge of
environmental protection and removes the spotlight from
politics, power, and the state (for a similar comment, see
Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008, xi). Normative com-
mitments shape individuals’ behaviours, but in the absence
of public regulatory coordination, people will not make
sufficient efforts to protect the environment. Otherwise,
why would uncoordinated, normatively driven behaviour
not already has succeeded? While norms are certainly
influential, supportive institutions and policies are always
necessary to deal with significant environmental problems
(e.g., Chong et al. 2015). To use an analogy with the
welfare state: Could voluntary charitable contributions by
firms and households ever yield the same benefits to the
poor and the unfortunate as do social insurance schemes
funded out of tax revenues?
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Third, an approach known as ecological modernization
(EM), on the other hand, adopts more of a meso-level
focus. As discussed above, most sociology today works
at this kind of level, having dispensed with universalistic
theories and seeking instead to explain variation in time
and space. Yet, environmental sociology adopting an EM
perspective has suffered from being frustratingly vague. In
contrast to TP, EM expects capitalism to be tameable, such
that economic growth can accompany substantial environ-
mental improvements (Mol, Spaargaren, and Sonnenfeld
2014). But where TP has been boldly definitive in its
claims – to the point of overreaching – EM has suffered
from timidity, becoming weighted with a confusing diver-
sity of facets and meanings (Buttel 2000). It is variously
used to describe (a) a normative policy agenda; (b) a
positive social theory (a predictive theory of how societies
act in practice); and (c) a theory of possibility (about how
societies could act, in principle).
EM emerged in a somewhat haphazard way out of
efforts to understand how environmental improvement –
evidence of which was growing in the 1980s – could be
possible (Buttel 2000; Murphy 2000). Jorgenson and
Clark (2012, 1) therefore interpret it to be making the
predictive claim ‘that even though economic development
harms the environment, the magnitude of the harmful link
decreases over the course of development’. York, Rosa,
and Dietz (2003, 286) on the other hand suggest that,
according to EM, firms ‘willingly internalize the environ-
mental costs of production’ (see also Rudel, Roberts, and
Carmin 2011). Jänicke (2008, 558) defines ecological
modernization as ‘the innovation and diffusion of environ-
mental technologies’, while Brulle and Antonio (2015,
900) summarize EM as a normative agenda ‘designed …
to sustain the regime of accumulation and the political,
economic, and cultural drivers of climate change’. In light
of this wide range of definitions, EM seems more of a
Rorschach test than a scientific theory. Advocates of TP
might object that critics are misinterpreting the theory, but
if so their own imprecision seems largely to blame.
Empirical tests of EM in its predictive guise do not
find it to be particularly successful, since many environ-
mental problems are not going away (e.g., Jorgenson and
Clark 2012). Adjudicated this way, EM performs no better
than TP. EM is more credible than TP; however, in its
recognizing and allowing for the possibility of environ-
mental improvement: ‘capitalist production, complex tech-
nologies, industrialisation and state bureaucracies do not
have to be environmentally harmful’ (Mol 2000, 48,
emphasis added). Yet, it has yielded few insights about
the conditions under which economic growth accompanies
environmental protection rather than degradation.
The concept of externalities helps resolve the tensions
among these perspectives. Where normative approaches de-
emphasize the role of regulatory actions by the state –
whether market-based or otherwise – the concept of extern-
alities draws attention to them, as well as to the public
goods character of environmental protection, and the
importance of incentives. Where neo-Marxist approaches
struggle to explain positive cases of environmental protec-
tion, an externalities perspective identifies effective state
regulation as a critical proximate cause – and points to
options for many more such measures. Where EM makes
vague predictions of environmental improvement in con-
texts of rising incomes, an externalities perspective focuses
on the political question of why the state may or may not
take regulatory action against externalities in a given case.
From an externalities perspective, economic growth is
neither inevitably bad nor good for the environment, and
the same holds for capitalism. Rather than maintaining that
capitalism (e.g., Wright 2015) or growth (Victor 2010;
Dietz and O’Neill 2013) or population increases (Ehrlich
and Harte 2015; Royal Society Science Policy Centre
2012) need to disappear, sociologists therefore should be
investigating what kinds of policies – and indeed what
kinds of capitalism – are more conducive to sustainability,
and can make economic growth and population increases
environmentally benign.13
6. Conclusions
Externalities should be a constructively unifying concept
for environmental research across the social sciences. In
providing a common understanding of the sources of the
contemporary crisis of environmental degradation, the
concept of externalities could help the social sciences
work together more constructively, such as in identifying
solutions. The concept is provocative, in that its diagnosis
of environmental problems amounts to powerful advocacy
for major policy changes – albeit possibly within a capi-
talist framework of continued economic growth and tech-
nological innovation. It is perhaps not quite radical, then,
but it comes close.
Future research in environmental sociology could con-
structively address a wide range of issues, three of which I
will touch on briefly here.
First, there is the question of the power of corporations
to prevent the introduction of measures for environmental
protection – fitting into broad themes of political economy,
and the power of business generally. Some firms externa-
lizing the costs of their activities use their political influ-
ence to ensure that governments do not get in their way.
On the other hand, there are also those that accept or even
ask for more stringent environmental regulations (e.g.,
Bonds 2016; Pulver 2007; Vogel 2000). And even when
corporations resist the introduction of new environmental
protections, they do not always get what they want. There
remains much room for research then on how much power
corporations have over environmental policy, the condi-
tions under which that power increases or decreases, and
conversely the conditions under which firms do not work
to prevent the introduction of stronger environmental
protections.
Second, sociologists have already articulated very poli-
tical views of issues of environmental degradation and
protection – see for example Dietz et al. (2015), who
find that CO2 emissions across US states and within states
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over time are correlated with features of state politics. Yet,
there remains considerable scope for further research on
the politics of environmental protection. Some research for
example finds surprisingly weak relationships between the
ideologies of countries’ governing parties and their actual
track records in terms of environmental performance
(Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2015; Neumayer
2003).14 There are also important questions to be
addressed about the power of the rich vis-à-vis the poor.
For the very rich, some studies have found that climate
change is a minor concern, unlike for professionals (Page,
Bartels, and Seawright 2013). Yet, such research has
focused particularly on America, and there is a need for
more comparative perspectives. Likewise, the sources of
public preferences remain poorly understood (Keohane
2015).
Third, finally, sociologists could make further contri-
butions to our understanding of the ubiquitous inequalities
in communities’ exposures to environmental pollution
(Brulle and Pellow 2006). Recent trends in pollution expo-
sure in America show enduring inequalities, even as pol-
lution exposure has overall been declining (Ard 2015;
Pais, Crowder, and Downey 2014; Grant et al. 2010).
Different communities are differentially able to prevent
the incursion (or maintenance) of industrial facilities pol-
luting the local environment (power plants, chemical fac-
tories, incinerators, etc.). Yet, we do not yet know much
about the resources that give some communities more
power than others (Ard and Fairbrother forthcoming).
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Notes
1. Pearce (2002) provides a good intellectual history of envir-
onmental economics, placing externalities at the centre. The
modern concept of externalities originates largely with
Arthur Cecil Pigou, an early twentieth century English
economist (see Sandmo 2015).
2. See Appendix A in the supplemental online material for
details.
3. Technically, not only costs but also benefits can be exter-
nalized – such as the aesthetic benefits to passers-by of an
attractive garden in front of a private house.
4. Unless speaking of ‘environmental hazards’ like earth-
quakes and hurricanes that would occur even in the absence
of any human forcing, this article will not consider that
usage of ‘environmental;’.
5. On the optimum level of biodiversity, for example, see
Helm and Hepburn (2014).
6. Though, arguably, we might weight net costs or benefits to
some people more than others—perhaps in the interest of
greater social equality, for example; in a utilitarian sense,
such weighting might favour actions that reduce social
well-being on aggregate.
7. Thus, the ‘Polluter-Pays Principle’, which was adopted for
example by the OECD in 1972 as an official guiding
principle for policy design (OECD 1992).
8. For a long time, states predominantly responded to envir-
onmental externalities not using market-based measures,
but regulations that have become known as ‘command-
and-control’. The track record of policies of this kind is
also generally good.
9. The most stinging critiques within sociology come from
advocates of the neo-Marxist Treadmill of Production per-
spective described below.




includes international aviation but excludes emissions due
to land use change.
11. It is arguably an over-simplification to attach the ‘Treadmill
or Production’ label to a variety of different eco-Marxist
perspectives (see Buttel 2004), but for the purposes of the
argument here, the differences among them are minor.
12. According to data from the World Health Organization
www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/databases/cities/
en/ and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC,
respectively. Per capita greenhouse gas emissions are also
highly variable across U.S. states—much lower in
California, for example, than in much poorer Louisiana
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/analysis/
pdf/stateanalysis.pdf.
13. As noted even by some Marxist commentators (e.g.,
Harvey 2006), capitalism is remarkably adaptable and
may therefore be better placed to survive the challenge of
ecological crisis (and/or the policy response to it) than TP
and other Marxists suggest.
14. Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins (2015) find little rela-
tionship between governments’ left/right ideologies ‘except
perhaps in Anglo-Saxon countries’.
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